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One of the major criticisms of stated preference data is hypothetical bias. Using a 
unique dataset of both stated and actual behavior, we test for hypothetical bias of stated 
preference survey responses. We consider whether respondents tend to overstate their 
participatory sporting event behavior ex ante when compared to their actual behavior 
at different registration fees. We find t hat s tated b ehavior a ccurately p redicts actual 
behavior at a middle level of respondent certainty, overpredicts actual behavior at 
a lower level of certainty, and underpredicts behavior at a higher level of certainty. 
This result suggests that respondent uncertainty corrections can be used to mitigate 
hypothetical bias and stated preference data can be used to better understand actual 
behavior in situations where no data exist. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The contingent valuation method (CVM) elic-
its statements of hypothetical willingness-to-pay.
In a recent symposium on contingent valuation
in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Kling,
Phaneuf, and Zhao (2012) provide a balanced
overview and Carson (2012) argues that the CVM
is “a practical alternative when prices aren’t avail-
able.” In stark contrast, Hausman’s (2012) opin-
ion on CVM has gone from “dubious to hopeless”
in its ability to measure the value accurately.1 One
of Hausman’s (2012) three issues with contin-
gent valuation is “hypothetical response bias that
leads contingent valuation to overstatements of
value.” To test for hypothetical bias, most studies
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1. Haab et al. (2013) more thoroughly review the liter-
ature and argue that Hausman’s “selective” review misses
evidence supporting the ability of stated preference data to
provide useful information.
use some form of the stylized null hypothesis that
stated preference responses are equal to actual
behavior when money or some other real outcome
is at stake. If the hypothesis is rejected, the stated
preference study suffers from hypothetical bias.
Several meta-analyses compare value esti-
mates from stated and actual choices. List and
Gallet (2001) and Little and Berrens (2004) find
that values based on hypothetical willingness-
to-pay and willingness-to-accept statements are
about three times higher than those based on
real choices. Murphy et al. (2005), using only
the willingness-to-pay data, find hypothetical
values are about 1.35 times higher than those
based on real choices. All of the meta-analyses
studies evaluate lab and field experimental data
before hypothetical bias mitigation approaches
were used extensively. When hypothetical bias
remains, there are several approaches to hypo-
thetical bias mitigation in contingent valuation
(Loomis 2011). Champ and Bishop (2001) find
that respondents who rate themselves, at least,
seven of ten on a certainty scale on a voluntary
contribution question behave similarly when
faced with the actual choice. Blumenschein et al.
(2008) employ a qualitative certainty scale and
find that respondents who are “very certain”
about their hypothetical choice behave similarly
in the actual setting. Carson and Groves (2007)
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argue that consequential contingent valuation
surveys will not suffer from hypothetical bias.
Landry and List (2007) find no hypothetical
bias when responses are consequential in a field
experiment. Vossler and Watson (2013) find no
hypothetical bias when comparing stated and
actual referendum votes for respondents who
believe the survey is consequential.
In the contingent behavior literature, there
have been two test-retest studies where no hypo-
thetical bias is found. Loomis (1993) compares
stated length of stay on recreation trips collected
at a lake with a hypothetical water level versus
actual length of stay when the hypothetical
water level was realized and finds no statistically
significant difference. Grijalva et al. (2002) find
that stated preference rock climbing trips fall
with a hypothetical closure of rock climbing
areas. When the areas are subsequently closed,
actual trips differ in the expected direction and
by similar magnitudes.2 Whitehead et al. (2008)
argue that combining revealed and stated pref-
erence data can be used to mitigate hypothetical
bias in contingent behavior data. For example,
Whitehead (2005) and Whitehead, Noonan, and
Marquardt (2014) find that survey respondents
overstate their future behavior.3 Using jointly
estimated revealed and stated preference data
models, a common hypothetical bias correction
yields statistically equivalent predictions of the
actual behavior in both studies. Overall, the
results of the more recent contingent valuation
and behavior studies suggest that hypothetical
bias can occur under some circumstances but
there are methods to mitigate the effect.
We use a blend of the contingent valuation
and behavior methods to estimate the demand
for a sports tourism event and consider whether
hypothetical bias can be mitigated by using an
intensity of preference correction. We conduct
surveys of participants of a popular organized
bike ride in 2011 and 2012. In 2011, we ask
riders if they would participate in the 2012 ride
at the current registration fee and ask about
willingness-to-pay higher registration fees. In
2012, the registration fee was increased by $10.
Using these data, we conduct nonparametric and
2. The test-retest studies are inherently different than tests
of convergent validity of revealed and stated preference data
where comparisons are made at a single point in time (e.g.,
Dickie, Fisher, and Gerking 1987; Jeon and Herriges 2010;
Whitehead et al. 2010).
3. See also Atkinson and Whitehead (2015) who find a
similar magnitude of hypothetical bias but are not able to
mitigate the bias with joint estimation due to data limitations.
parametric tests for hypothetical bias at different
levels of respondent certainty. We then combine
revealed and stated preference data in a fixed
effects probit model and find that hypothetical
bias can be mitigated. Our results provide evi-
dence that hypothetical questions are “a practical
alternative when prices aren’t available” and are
neither “hopeless” nor “dubious.”
II. METHODS
Our data are from “Blood Sweat and Gears”
(BSG), a participatory bicycle sporting event.4
The BSG includes 50- and 100-mile bike rides
(the organizers insist on calling it a ride, but
many participants are racing) in and around
mountain communities in Watauga County, NC,
including the Blue Ridge Parkway. Participation
in the BSG is constrained with a limit of 1,250
riders on the Blue Ridge Parkway placed by the
National Park Service. Ninety-three riders were
on the 2011 waiting list and 456 were on the
2012 waiting list.5 Demand data were gathered
by surveys that were emailed to registered riders
after the 2011 BSG. Of the 1,156 registered rid-
ers with useable email addresses, 561 completed
the survey after three mailings. The response rate
is 48%. In 2012, 611 riders completed the survey
from 1,135 useable email addresses for a 54%
response rate. Deleting duplicate email addresses
from each year (i.e., multiyear and multifamily
participants), the sample size used for analysis
is 1,923 participants. Of these, 60% participated
in 2011 and 61% participated in 2012. A total of
21% participated in both years.
In the 2011 survey, respondents were told:
“Proceeds from the 2012 ride will benefit two
charities established by the Watauga County
Chapter of the American Red Cross. The Jeremy
Dale Fisher Fund and The Russell Fund provide
assistance to local families that are displaced
by fire, flood or similar disasters.” Respondents
who stated that they intended to participate in the
50-mile ride received the 50-mile ride question:
“The 50-mile route has a limit of 500 riders and
sold out in a week in 2011.” Respondents who
stated that they intended to participate in the
100-mile ride received a similar version: “The
100-mile route has a limit of 750 riders and sold
out in one day in 2011.” The stated preference
4. See the website for details: http://www
.bloodsweatandgears.org.
5. The 2014 BSG sold out in 16 minutes with 4,000
potential riders attempting to register for 1,250 spots.
scenario is a higher entrance fee: “One proposal
being considered is to charge a higher entrance
fee in order to provide even more assistance to
local families. Would you be willing to pay the
following entrance fees for the 2012 ride if you
knew all of the additional funds went to charity?”
Respondents were presented with a response
table. In the left-hand-side column were five
entrance fees, $60, $70, $80, $90, and $100. The
top row contained five responses, “definitely no,”
“probably no,” “not sure,” “probably yes,” and
“definitely yes.” Respondents checked a box in
each entrance fee row to indicate their intention
to participate at different fees (see Appendix S1,
Supporting Information). The registration fee in
2011 was $60.
III. HYPOTHETICAL BIAS MITIGATION
Previous research has found that recoding
uncertain positive stated behavior responses
(e.g., “for,” “yes,” or “would purchase”) to
negative responses (e.g., “against,” “no,” or
“would not purchase”) more closely aligns stated
with actual behavior (e.g., Blumenschein et al.
2008; Champ and Bishop 2001). In this context,
recoding may better account for respondents
who are uncertain about their demand and would
not actually donate or purchase the good in a
real situation. In the current context, there may
be more uncertainty in the stated behavior data
than in previous CVM applications. The stated
behavior was elicited 6 months ahead of the 2012
BSG registration date and almost a full year
ahead of the participation date. Given that the
BSG requires preparation and rigorous, injury
free training, many respondents may be relatively
certain that they are willing to participate but rela-
tively uncertain if they will be able to participate.
Furthermore, respondents may be willing and
able to participate at the time of registration but
unable to register given the derby-style online
process. As such, we investigate alternative
recodings of the stated preference variable.
Carson and Groves (2007) argue that respon-
dents will answer valuation questions truthfully if
they consider the survey to be consequential and
the value elicitation question is incentive com-
patible. A consequential survey has a nonzero
probability of influencing a real outcome. The
BSG post-ride survey is expected to be conse-
quential because each respondent knew that it
was being conducted for the BSG organizers who
would likely consider the results when planning
the 2012 event. On the first page of the survey,
respondents are told that “the information gath-
ered in this study will help the Blood Sweat and
Gears Committee better organize future rides.”
We assume that all respondents considered the
survey consequential because we did not ask a
consequentiality debriefing question as has been
carried out in other studies (e.g., Vossler and
Watson 2013).
The willingness-to-pay question is incentive
compatible for some respondents but not others
which may allow for strategic behavior. Those
who are willing to pay more for registration will
respond truthfully positively to the participation
question. This will influence organizers to raise
fees, reduce the pool of riders, and increase the
probability of a successful registration. Those
respondents who are not willing to pay a higher
registration fee but intend to register also have an
incentive to truthfully respond negatively when
faced with the higher fees.
The willingness-to-pay question provides
opportunities for other respondents to behave
strategically in one of two ways. Participants
who are not willing to pay higher fees and rel-
atively negative about their future participation
may respond strategically positive to higher fees.
Those participants who would like for BSG
charitable donations to increase would respond
strategically by indicating participation knowing
that they will not have to pay the extra fee. To
minimize this effect, we do not ask the higher
fee question to those who state that they will
definitely not participate in 2012 at the current
fee. Second, consider those who intend to par-
ticipate and might be willing to pay more but
want to influence organizers to keep fees low.
Those respondents who are willing to risk not
being able to register due to the larger pool of
registrants will respond strategically negative
to the participation question in order to try to
influence organizers to keep fees low.
IV. RESULTS
Each respondent could answer up to five stated
preference questions but some of these responses
are redundant. A redundant response is one in
which the respondent states that they would def-
initely pay an even higher amount or would
definitely not pay an even lower amount. For
example, if the respondent would definitely pay
$60 and $70 we discard the $60 response. If
the respondent would definitely not pay $90
and $100, we discard the $100 response. We
include all respondents who answered at least
TABLE 1
Revealed and Stated Preference Participation Data
Participation
Year Cases
Stated
Preference Fee
Definitely
Yes (%)
Definitely and
Probably Yes (%)
Definitely Yes,
Probably Yes,
and Not Sure (%)
2011 1,923 0 60 59.85
2012 316 1 60 55.70 89.87 98.42
2012 412 1 70 22.33 66.26 84.47
2012 383 1 80 5.74 31.85 63.97
2012 332 1 90 0.60 15.06 43.67
2012 305 1 100 15.41 26.23 49.51
2012 1,923 0 70 60.89
one nonredundant stated preference question. A
total of 16% (n= 79) of the sample of 501 pro-
vides one stated preference question response,
8% provides two (n= 42), 17% provides three
(n= 83), 30% provides four (n= 149), and 30%
of the sample (n= 148) provides five stated pref-
erence responses.
The total number of stated preference
responses is 1,748 with between 54% and 73%
of the sample of 501 answering stated preference
questions at each entrance fee (Table 1). In
general, the responses exhibit rationality with the
percentage of “definitely yes” responses falling
from 56% to 15% as the fee rises from $60 to
$100. Our study allows a test of hypothetical bias
because the entrance fee for the BSG was raised
from $60 to $70 in 2012. Each respondent’s
answer to the $70 entrance fee question and
intention to ride the 50- or 100-mile route can be
compared with their actual registration behavior
in the 2012 ride. For this analysis, we include
redundant responses to facilitate a direct com-
parison. For example, if the survey respondent
answered “definitely yes” to a registration fee of
$80, we include them as a “definitely yes” at the
$60 and $70 fees.
Two hundred and twelve 2011 survey respon-
dents actually registered for the 2012 BSG. In our
sample, 33% answered “definitely yes” and 69%
answered “probably yes” to the 2012 BSG partic-
ipation question with a $70 entrance fee. These
responses provide upper and lower bounds to the
actual return participation of 42% for the 2011
sample. In contrast, 68% of respondents state that
they will definitely participate at the $60 entrance
fee while 93% would probably participate. At
the $80 entrance fee, only 14% state that they
will definitely participate and 35% state that they
would probably participate. The aggregate stated
preference data provide evidence of predictive
validity. Stated preferences at the $70 entrance
fee are more accurate than the stated preferences
at the $60 and $80 entrance fees when predicting
actual behavior at the $70 fee.
When we consider individual predictions at
the $70 fee with the “definitely yes” response for
501 participants with stated preference data, 14%
of respondents successfully predicted their own
participation and 39% successfully predicted
their nonparticipation. Although 29% stated that
they definitely would not participate but did,
19% stated that they definitely would participate
and did not. When we consider individual pre-
dictions with the “probably yes” response, 30%
of respondents successfully predicted their own
participation and 19% successfully predicted
their nonparticipation at the $70 fee. Although
12% stated that they probably would not par-
ticipate but did, 39% stated that they probably
would participate and did not.
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
In this section, we describe the empirical
model to estimate the ability of stated prefer-
ence behavior data to predict actual behavior.
Conceptually, the categorical response, yi, to the
registration fee participation question depends
on whether willingness-to-pay is greater than the
registration fee. Because we have no individual-
specific information from survey nonrespondents
and pseudo-panel data, from two to seven
revealed and stated preference responses for
each respondent, we estimate a fixed effects
panel probit, π
[
yzit = 1
]
= ϕ
(
αi + β′xit
)
, where
yzit is the participation response, z is the participa-
tion threshold, αi is the individual-specific fixed
effect, β is the coefficient vector, xit is a vector
of independent variables (registration fee and a
TABLE 2
Fixed Effects Probit Participation Models
Definitely Definitely and Probably
Definitely, Probably,
and Not Sure
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
FEE −.0415* .0028 −.0576* .0026 −.0503* .0026
SP −1.119* .0678 .012 .0671 .663* .0728
Log-likelihood function −2,859.55 −3,007.88 −2,940.81
Akaike Information Criterion 9,147.10 9,407.80 9,207.60
Marginal fee effect −.0153 −.0229 −.0199
Fee elasticity −3.10 −3.48 −2.54
Sample size 5,594 5,594 5,594
Individuals 1,923 1,923 1,923
*Statistically significant coefficient at the p= .01 level.
stated preference dummy variable), i= 1, … ,
1,923 participants and t= 1, … , Ti time periods.
Three participation thresholds are estimated:
“definitely yes,” “probably yes,” and “not sure.”
We report regression results in Table 2. We
find that the coefficient on the registration fee
is negative and statistically significant in each
model in accordance with economic theory. In
the model where we code only “definitely yes”
stated preference responses as participating in
BSG, the stated preference dummy variable is
negative and statistically significant indicating
that the stated preference data understate actual
behavior. In the model where we code “def-
initely yes” and “probably yes” responses as
participating, the stated preference variable is
not statistically different from zero indicating
that the stated preference data is consistent with
actual behavior. In the final model, where we
code “definitely yes,” “probably yes,” and “not
sure” responses as participating in BSG, the
stated preference variable is positive and statis-
tically significant. In this final model, our results
indicate that the stated preference data overstate
actual behavior and common hypothetical bias
result exists. We find that using an intensity of
preference correction can mitigate for hypo-
thetical bias but using only individuals who are
“definitely sure” will overcorrect the problem.
VI. APPLICATION
In order to illustrate the potential usefulness of
stated preference data, as in the study by Teasley,
Bergstrom, and Cordell (1994), we conduct a
simulation exercise to determine the revenue
maximizing registration fee. Considering the
model where “definitely yes” and “probably yes”
responses are coded as participating in the event,
the average marginal effect of the registration
fee coefficient, ∂π/∂fee=Φ(·)βfee, suggests that
a $10 increase in the registration fee reduces the
probability of participation by 2.3% at the mean
probability (Table 2). The registration demand is
elastic, εfee = (∂π/∂fee)(fee/π), indicating that an
increase in the registration fee would decrease
revenue (and vice versa) (Table 2).
A simulation of the probit probability function
is used to estimate the number of riders at reg-
istration fees between $0 (n= 3,953) and $100
(n= 90). Without the quantity constraint of 1,250
riders, fee revenue is maximized at $160,217 with
a fee of $50 and 3,204 riders. These results could
be used by BSG organizers to encourage the
National Park Service to relax the quantity con-
straint. With the quantity constraint, fee revenue
is maximized at $91,250 and a fee of $72. Pre-
liminary results similar to this were used by BSG
organizers to raise the registration fee from $60
to $70. Revenue increased by over $10,000 as
a result.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Hypothetical bias is considered a major prob-
lem in stated preference methods. While the
percentage of correct predictions is only around
50%, we find evidence that (1) aggregate predic-
tions based on the actual price increase are more
accurate than predictions made with higher and
lower prices and (2) the stated preference data
accurately predict actual behavior in an empirical
model that accounts for unobserved heterogene-
ity across respondents. Considering (2), we show
that respondent certainty corrections can align
stated preferences with revealed preferences.
We find that respondents who answer “probably
yes” and “definitely yes” about participation in
a sports tourism event behave similarly in the
actual situation.
Our results are consistent with much of the lit-
erature in marketing, environmental, and health
economics where researchers are cautiously opti-
mistic about the ability of stated preference data
to predict actual behavior (Blumenschein et al.
2008; Champ and Bishop 2001; Sun and Morwitz
2010). In contrast to previous studies, our cali-
bration approach suggests a cutoff that allows for
respondent uncertainty compared with other con-
tingent valuation studies that find more certain
thresholds best predict actual behavior. We sug-
gest that respondent uncertainty might reflect not
only the willingness-to-pay but also the ability
to participate based upon the cyclists’ physi-
cal health and training. Future research should
focus on methods that enhance understanding of
certainty adjustments in different contexts.
While some may interpret these results as
informative, they are not necessarily unbiased
estimates of BSG demand. Carson and Groves
(2007) argue that the incentive structure of stated
preference questions can be used to predict
strategic behavior. Because the BSG fee was
$60 in 2011 and the rationale for a higher fee
was an increase in charitable donations and not
a take it or leave it offer, respondents have an
incentive to state that they will not participate in
an effort to keep the registration fee low. Others
may wish to increase charitable donations. Some
evidence on the dominance of these types of
strategic behavior is from the asymmetric indi-
vidual prediction errors. Although 29% stated
that they definitely would not participate but did,
19% stated that they definitely would participate
and did not. Therefore, decision makers should
use these results with the caution that the actual
BSG demand is likely to be less elastic than the
elasticity estimates provided here. The practical
implication is that the model might overpre-
dict the changes resulting from higher and
lower registration fees. But, at least an educated
guess about the direction of the bias can be made.
Future research should develop incentive compat-
ible stated preference questions for this context.
Last, we conduct a simulation exercise to
provide evidence about whether the stated pref-
erence data provide “a practical alternative when
prices aren’t available” as Carson (2012) claims
or is “hopeless” as Hausman (2012) claims.
Our interpretation of the data and “real world”
experience supports Carson’s claim. As a result
of the 2011 BSG survey and preliminary analysis
of the stated preference data, BSG organizers
raised the registration fee to $70 and generated
over $10,000 more for charity. This may be
prima facie evidence that stated preference data
are not “hopeless.”
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